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CAUSAL RELATIONS AND THE
FELONY-MURDER RULE
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUMt
I.
It is probable that one who commences a search through the
early books in quest of the origin of the felony-murder rule and
the corollary manslaughter-misdemeanor doctrine will come at
last to the case of Lord Dacres as one of its first important articu-
lations. Lord Dacres, with a group of companions, went unlaw-
fully to hunt in a forest in the year 1535. One of the party was
accosted by a keeper and killed him while the others were a long
way off. It was held murder in all the group, and Lord Dacres
was hanged.'
Other cases of the same period testify to the fact that the
felony-murder doctrine was fairly well established in the law of
the time. Just a year after the decision in the Dacres case, it was
held that all the members of a group which gathered to seize
some goods in a house were guilty of murder when a stone thrown
at an occupant of the house missed its mark and killed a woman
emerging from the doorway.2 One finds the dictum of Coke re-
ferred to often in the cases:
If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A., meaning to
steale a deere in the park of B., shooteth at the deer, and by
the glance the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush,
this is murder, for the act was unlawful, although A. had no
intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him. .... 3
But the case of the English lord who was a poor judge of hunting
companions will serve as well as any for a point of departure,
the more so because there are problems connected with the super-
ficially simple set of facts which are still significant even today.
The rule which the legal profession of the period drew from
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. The Lord Dacres' Case, Moo. K.B. 216, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (1535). The
case is cited here because it has survived as precedent. Rex. v. Plummer,
12 Mod. 627, 630, 88 Eng. Rep. 1565, 1567 (1699); Sir Charles Stanley's
Case, Kel. J. 86, 84 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1663); HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
465 (1st Amer. ed., Small, 1847). Some versions of the case state that the
parties had agreed beforehand to kill anyone who resisted. Rex. v. Borth-
wick, 1 Doug. 207, 212, 99 Eng. Rep. 136, 138 (1779).
2. Mansell & Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (1536).
3. 3 Co. INST. *56.
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such cases may be shortly expressed by saying that it was held
that the killing of man by an act done in the commission of a
felony was murder in all who participated in the felony,4 and
that if the crime was a misdemeanor-or if it was a mere civil
trespass-the death was manslaughter.5 Coke's specification that
the act need be merely unlawful never had much influence in the
cases. The rationale of the rule is not difficult to grasp. The
common law defined murder as occurring when a man of sound
memory and discretion unlawfully killed another with malice
aforethought, either expressed by the party or implied by law,
the death occurring within a year and a day after the attack on
the victim.0 It is to be observed that malice aforethought is
necessary for the commission of crimes other than murder7
Assume the case of a man who committed a felonious act, such
as going to shoot a deer on land belonging to another. Pretty
clearly he had a wrongful intent. If, in the course of his criminal
act, he should do some act which resulted in the death of another,
the courts took the position that proof of his commission of the
one crime supplied all the proof that was necessary to conclu-
sively infer an intention on his part to commit the other, thus
making proof of express malice aforethought with respect to
the killing unnecessary."
This is all that the felony-murder rule, in the last analysis,
does. But when this is perceived, it is possible to see also that
when it is said that killing a man by an act done in the commis-
sion of a felony is murder, the conventional statement, a result
and not a reason is expressed. It may further be pointed out that
the explanation given above does not deal with the case where
4. Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887); Regina v. Horsey, 3 F. & F.
287, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (1862) ; Rex v. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627, 88 Eng. Rep.
1565 (1699); Sir Charles Stanley's Case, Kel. J. 86, 84 Eng. Rep. 1094
(1663); HALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 465.
5. "When an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful
act, it will be either murder or manslaughter, according to the nature of the
act which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious intent or in
its consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but if no
more was intended than a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to man-
slaughter." 4 BL. CoIM. 192-93.
6. 4 BL. Comm. *195-96; 3 Co. INsT. *47.
7. A thorough examination of the function of the concept of malice afore-
thought in criminal law is contained in Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice
Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 5a7 (1934).
5. HALE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 465, et seq.; 9 HALsnuRY, THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 429 (Hailsham ed. 1933). See also Note, 63 L.R.A. 353, 358
(1903).
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several persons are engaged in a felony, and only one of them
takes part in the actual slaying. The imposition of liability in
such a case appears to have been predicated upon reasons of
policy and upon ideas which bore a considerable resemblance to
agency principles. Each of the participants, it was said, ought to
be held responsible for the acts of the others, and since the killing
by the one member of the group would not have occurred but for
the underlying agreement to perform the original felony, the
killing was murder in all who took part in the original crime9
Little was said in the early decisions to show that much atten-
tion was paid to the problem of causation. Coke's description of
the rule shows pretty clearly its nature as the early lawyers
thought of it. If a death occurred during the course of a felony,
even though basically accidental in character as in the case of
the boy in the bush, liability for murder followed as a matter of
law. The underlying idea appears to have been that surrounding
the commission of a felony was a period of time approximately
coterminous with the felony during which any death having its
root in any act of the parties engaged in the perpetration of the
crime was murder, regardless of how it happened. 0 The cases
today still bear the imprint of that idea; it is often said that a
killing occurring during the res gestae of a crime is automatically
murder under the felony-murder rule." It will be interesting to
return to this idea later.
As felony-murder cases came before the courts, however, a
gradual change came over the original character of the rule.
Any rule of law which sends a man to his death is bound to be
disputed and litigated, and it was very easy for hard cases to
arise in cases where constructive murder was alleged. If a large
conspiracy to do a felony was present, it was a difficult thing to
send eight or nine persons to the gallows for the act of one, par-
9. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735 (1901); People v.
Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 129 N.E. 883 (1921); Sir Charles Stanley's Case,
Kel. J. 86, 84 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1663). See also CLARK & MARSHALL, A
TminT.sE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 188 (3d ed. 1927); Note, 29 Ky. L. J.
130 (1940).
10. A good exposition of this point of view is found in People v. Cabaltero,
96 Cal. App. 515, 87 P.2d 364 (1939). See also People v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y.
390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (1944).
11. State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W. 632 (1937) ; MacAvoy v. State,
144 Neb. 827, 15 N.W.2d 45, cert. denied 323 U.S. 804 (1944); People v.
Smith, 187 N.Y. Supp. 836, rev'd 282 N.Y. 329, 133 N.E. 574 (1921); State
v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404 (Nev. 1950).
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ticularly where the evidence showed that the other participants
had not desired violence and had been horrified when it occurred.
It is very possible that some of the modifications in the rule had
their roots in quantitative objections. 12 But more than that, there
were other troubles with the rule. It became apparent that it was
loosely put in the early cases. There were situations which fell
within what one judge referred to as the "mere words,"'' 1 but
did not fall within its spirit if the rule were looked at in the light
of other principles. One man shoves another, to cite an old ex-
ample, intending to steal a watch; the victim has a weak heart
and dies from a force which would not have affected one person
in ten thousand. Shoving a man may be unlawful and wrong,
as is stealing a watch. The trouble is that it is not an act which
is very dangerous or likely to produce death, and it is therefore
hard to say honestly that death was intended.
The courts tended to express this difficulty in terms of causa-
tion. Suppose a man committed a crime and during the course of
it did some act, innocent under other circumstances, which un-
expectedly resulted in death. It was difficult to say that the il-
legality underlying the otherwise innocent act had increased the
risk of death or had operated to bring it about. The reaction of
the courts in some of the later cases was that such a situation
was not within the purview of the rule. A man was only respon-
sible for the natural and probable consequences of his own acts,
it was pointed out.14 It was not sufficient merely that death occur
during the commission of the felony or closely afterwards in
point of time and place.1 The relationship of cause and effect
12. In Rex v. Borthwick, 1 Doug. 207, 212, 99 Eng. Rep. 136, 138 (1779),
the members of a press-gang were all involved. In Rex v. Plummer, 12 Mod.
627, 630, 88 Eng. Rep. 1565, 1567 (1699), the conspiracy involved eight
persons. In both the convictions were reversed. In Rex v. Plummer, in
particular, the opinion shows marked traces of a deliberate attempt on the
part of the judges to avoid the necessity of applying the felony-murder
rule to a large group of persons. It is interesting to compare Rex V. Plum-
mer with People v. Cabaltero, 96 Cal. App. 515, 87 P.2d 364 (1939). In
both, a member of a group of conspirators killed another conspirator during
the commission of an offense. In Rex v. Plummer the collateral nature of
the killing was held a defense in the rest of the group. People v. Cabaltero,
a modern decision, held otherwise in the teeth of the fact that the California
statute was basically an embodiment of the common law. See Note, 27
CALiF. L. RFv. 612 (1939).
13. Stephen, J., in Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C.C. 311, 312 (1887).
14. Regina v. Horsey, 3 F. & F. 287, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (1862).
15. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 9, § 236; WHARTON, HOMICIDE
§ 358 (2d ed. 1875). See also Arent & McDonald, The Felony-Murder
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had to exist between the felony and the murder before it was
logical to impose liability on the felon for the death.16 If such a
relationship did not exist between the two occurrences, then the
person responsible for the one was not responsible for the other.
II.
Under what circumstances, then, is it possible to find a causal
connection between felony and death? It is in the answers given
by the courts to this question that one finds much of the difficulty
surrounding the felony-murder rule. When once the courts had
come to the conclusion that the problems of causation were in-
herent in the application of the felony-murder rule, it is clear
that they had transformed what was once a comparatively simple
rule into one much less so. Whatever else its defects may have
been, the old view was, at least on paper, simple and fairly clear
cut. The adoption of an additional requirement that a chain of
causation exist between the criminal nature of the act and the
"resulting" death, on the other hand, brought at once all of the
uncertainties of the law of causation into the picture.17
Moreover, it brought them into the cases in a particularly
unfortunate context. There are several reasons why this was
and is true. In the first place, a crime is generally a violent,
emotion-packed transaction. There are elements in almost all
felony-murder cases which tend to sway the emotions and opin-
ions of judge and jury against the prisoner. Often his crime is
of a nature which shocks the moral sensitivities of ordinary
persons, such as rape, abortion, violent robbery and the like. It
is difficult in such situations to listen calmly and objectively to
the prisoner's argument that the relationship of cause and effect
did not exist, that other forces and not his own crime were in the
final analysis the effective cause of death.
In addition, the beginning and end of the period of responsi-
bility are inherently difficult to determine. For years the law has
Doctrine and Its Application Under the New York Statutes, 20 CoRN. L. Q.
288, 301 et seq. (1935) (a lucid and informative discussion).
16. CLARK & MARsHALL, op. cit. supra note 9, § 236.
17. "In murder, just as we saw in the case of Attempts, there is a point
at which the law refuses to continue to trace out chains of causation; and
beyond which, therefore, any act is regarded as too remote to produce guilt.
But here, as before in attempts, it is impossible to lay down any general
rule for fixing this point; and the utmost that can be done is to suggest it
approximately by illustrative instances." KENNY, OUTLINEs OF CRIMINAL
LAW 127 (12th ed. 1926).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
wrestled with the question of when a crime begins, i.e., what
constitutes an attempt to commit a crime, and has failed to arrive
at satisfactory criteria. 8 The same difficulty arises when one
attempts to resolve the question of when a particular criminal
transaction has come to its logical and legal conclusion.
The Res Gestae Test
The nature of the causal relationship between crime and death
which is necessary under the so-called res gestae principle is
fairly well stated in a Missouri case:
It is held in many jurisdictions, including Missouri, that
when the homicide is within the res gestae of the initial
crime and is an emanation thereof, it is committed in the
perpetration of that crime in the statutory sense. Thus it
has been often ruled that the statute applies where the initial
crime and the homicide were parts of one continuous trans-
action, and were closely related in point of time, place, and
causal relation ....
On the surface, and at first reading, this would appear to be a
fairly clear and explicit statement of an easy rule to follow. But
consider for a moment what the court is actually saying: if the
death occurred during the course of a criminal transaction, it is
murder. The death occurred during the course of criminal trans-
action if it was closely related in point of time and place and if
there was a causal relation.
Such a statement, it is submitted, does not solve the problem.
It does not aid analysis to say that a connection between a felony
and a homicide exists if the homicide fell within the res gestae
of a crime, and that the homicide fell within the res gestae of
the crime if a connection between the homicide and the crime
existed. The essential nature of the connection is not defined
by such logic.
It is true, the statement furnishes some help, but it is remark-
ably little when one analyzes it. If there was an element of con-
tinuity about what happened, if it was part of a "continuous
transaction," some indication of a causal relation is present. But
consider the various aspects which a continuous transaction may
take.
18. People v. Miller, 2 Cal.2d 527, 42 P.2d 308 (1935); People v. Rizzo,
246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927). "No abstract test can be given for
determining whether an act is sufficiently proximate to be an attempt."
KENNY, Op. cit. supra note 17, at 81.
19. State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632, 637 (1936).
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In the first place, it is possible for a homicide and a crime to be
parts of one continuous transaction although after the commis-
sion of the original crime no further act was done by the person
committing the crime. In one well-known case, a man raped a
small girl who died later of a venereal disease communicated
from the defendant in the course of the crime. The judge told the
jury they might convict of murder, i.e., that the second trans-
action, the death, was in the contemplation of the law a continua-
tion of the first. The jury, however, returned a manslaughter
verdict.20 In another, the defendant assaulted a woman with a
baby in her arms. The child was frightened and died in convul-
sions six weeks later. The defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter.21 In Regina v. Holland2 2 one man wounded another's
finger. The injured man declined to have the finger amputated,
disregarding the advice of his doctor. He died of tetanus. It was
held that the death was a proximate result of the defendant's
criminal act.
It is difficult to speak of such cases as involving a continuous
transaction in the sense of being a continuing series of acts on
the part of a criminal. In point of time and place, in each case
death occurred long after and far away from the place where the
independent felony was committed. The continuity involved was
continuity of legal responsibility rather than continuity of mo-
tion on the part of the defendants.
There is a second way to look at the theory of the "continuous
transaction," and that is to regard it as being a transaction in
which both felony and death occur at about the same time and
place in a series of continuous factual happenings. In such a
situation, at least two acts on the part of the defendant are re-
quired, the commission of the original felony and the commission
of an act which causes death. But as to what constitutes a con-
tinuous factual transaction, the courts are badly split. Consider,
for a moment, the case of a man who rapes a woman and then
kills her. It may be argued that the commission of the felony is
ended as soon as the act of intercourse is complete, and therefore
that the killing is not committed in the course of a felony.2 Con-
20. Regina v. Greenwood, 7 Cox C.C. 404 (1857).
21. Regina v. Towe, 12 Cox C.C. 530 (1874).
22. 2 M. & Rob. 351, 174 Eng. Rep. 313 (1841).
23. "It is not enough that the killing occurred soon or presently after
the felony was attempted or committed. There must be such a legal relation-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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versely, it may be argued that there was a "continuous" character
to the transaction; the defendant proceeded directly from com-
mitting one crime to committing another, and hence his killing
was within the res gestae of the original crime.24
Other cases illustrate the same difficulty in defining what con-
stitutes a "continuous" transaction. Suppose a crime such as
burglary has been committed, and the criminals are discovered
in the act of fleeing from the premises. Is a killing which occurs
at that point one which is within the res gestae of the felony?
On such an issue, there is room for divergence of opinion, and
the courts have held both ways. 25
But the reason behind the conflict of decisions involving deaths
during the course of escape has, at bottom, little to do with any
question involving the idea of res gestae. When analyzed, the
decisions revolve about a difference in the substantive law on an
entirely different point. The cases holding that a killing is within
the res gestae of the original felony when committed during the
course of an escape do so on the theory that escape is in itself
an integral part of the underlying felony.28 The decisions the
other way confine the independent felony, on the other hand,
strictly to those acts leading up to and including the actual viola-
tion of law, and exclude escape from those acts.27
To speak of such cases as turning upon doctrines of res gestae
is actually pointless. Reference may be made here to the point
that the term has apparently crept into the felony-murder cases
ship between the two that it can be said that the killing occurred by reason
of and as part of the felony, to wit, rape; or that it occurs before the felony
was at an end; so that the felony had a legal relationship to the killing and
was concurrent with it in part, at least, and a part of it in an actuaT and
material sense .... Tersely put, death must have been the probable conse-
quence of the unlawful act." State v. Opher, 38 Del. 93, 96, 188 Atl. 257,
258 (1936).
24. MacAvoy v. State, 144 Neb. 827, 15 N.W.2d 45, cert. denied 323 U.S.
804 (1944). Accord: Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E.2d
241 (1944) ; Commonwealth v. Osman, 284 Mass. 421, 188 N.E. 226 (1933).
25. Cases holding the felony-murder rule applicable include State v.
Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So.2d 785 (1948); State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010,
139 So. 463 (1931) ; State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632 (1936).
Contra.: Huggins v. State, 149 Miss. 280, 115 So. 213 (1928); People v.
Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535 (1919); People v. Huther, 184 N.Y.
237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906).
26. Arent & McDonald, supra note 15, at 303-05; Note, 108 A.L.R.
841 (1937).
27. It is to be noted that it is often suggested in these cases that the
parties may, by agreement beforehand on a specific plan of committing
the felony, extend the scope of the felony to include the escape. People v.
Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535 (1919).
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as an import from the law of evidence and has proved no more
satisfactory there. Wigmore, speaking of the term, refers to it
caustically as "ambiguous,"28 "unmanageable,'" and a "shib-
boleth."3 , Thayer denounces it in much the same language, re-
marking that "judges, text-writers and students have found
themselves sadly embarrassed by the growing and intolerable
vagueness of the expression." 3' In view of the fact that Thayer's
comments appeared some seventy years ago, the survival of the
term in modern cases is a sad commentary upon the slowness of
change in the law.
The Probable Consequences Test
Many of the early cases, considering the problems inherent in
the felony-murder rule, laid down a rule that a killing occurring
during the course of a felony was not within the meaning of the
felony-murder rule unless the death was a natural and probable
outgrowth of the felony. Of these cases, certainly the most in-
teresting is Regina v. Horsey.2 The defendant was a transient
who set fire to a barn containing a quantity of straw. He was
captured at once, and while he and his captors were watching the
blaze a figure was seen running about in the barn attempting to
get out. It was obvious that the defendant had not known anyone
was in the barn. The judge charged the jury that while it was
the law that any killing during the commission of a felony was
murder, they might acquit if they found that the deceased had
entered the barn only after the fire had started, because in that
case it was his own act and not that of the defendant which had
caused his death. Jerome Frank has long stressed the point that
legal decisions are essentially unpredictable because of the
vagaries of the fact-finding process, and the case cited is one
which goes far to prove his point.3
28. 6 WIGMOR, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EvI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW ... § 1769 (3d ed. 1940) (discussing
the use of the res gestae concept in the field of liability for the act of a
fellow conspirator).
29. Id. at § 1767.
30. Ibid.
31. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae,
15 AM. L. REv. 71, 80-81 (1881).
32. 3 F. & F. 287, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (1862).
33. The subsequent testimony of the judge before a conmmittee of Parlia-
ment studying the necessity for changes in the law of homicide makes it
clear that the instruction in question was given simply to afford the jury an
intelligible way out of the necessity of applying the felony-murder rule to
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The most influential statement of the idea that liability should
be imposed under the felony-murder rule only where there is a
high degree of probability that the commission of a felony will
result in death was made in Regina v. Serne,34 a case which has
had a very considerable influence on the development of the law
in this area. The defendant had set fire to a store, intending to
collect the insurance. His son, sleeping in quarters adjacent to
the store, was killed in the fire. Discussing the felony-murder
rule in his charge to the jury, the judge said:
In my opinion the definition of the law which makes it mur-
der to kill by an act done in the commission of a felony
might and ought to be narrowed. . .. I think that instead
of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony
and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be rea-
sonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life,
and likely in itself to cause death, done for the purpose of
committing a felony which caused death, should be murder. 3
It is clear that the distinction suggested in Regina v. Serne,
between ordinary criminal acts and those criminal acts "known
to be dangerous to life," has found its way into many of the
American cases. The classic illustration is the case of the boot-
legger who illegally sold whiskey to a man who drank it, went
out into a storm, and died of acute alcoholism combined with
exposure to cold. Reversing a conviction of the bootlegger on a
charge of manslaughter, the Supreme Court of Michigan pointed
out that there was nothing inherently dangerous about the act of
selling liquor. It was not an act which in the normal experience
led to death. Accordingly, there was no reason to apply any
doctrine of constructive intent.36
Similar reasoning appears to lie behind many of the statutes
defining the limits of the felony-murder rule in the various states.
Many of them limit the full operation of the felony-murder rule
to the case of homicides committed only during the perpetration
of certain specified felonies, normally rape, arson, burglary, and
a case where the judge thought it inappropriate. See the testimony of
Baron Bramwell before the Homicide Amendment Committee, reprinted in
WHARTON, HomliCDn 41 (2d ed. 1875). See Frank, Words and Music: Some
Remarks on Statutory Intarpretation, 47 COL. L. REV. 1259, 1274-78 (1947),
for comment on situations of this type.
34. 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887). The case is discussed in HALL, PRINCIPLES
or CRimINAL LAW 356-58 (1947).
35. 16 Cox C.C. 311, 313 (1887).
36. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924). Cf. State v.
Reitze, 86 N.J.L. 407, 92 At. 576 (1914).
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robbery.31 These are considered cases of first degree murder.
Homicides committed during the commission of other felonies
are not regarded as being so intrinsically dangerous to human
life, and are therefore treated as second or third degree murder
or as manslaughter.
The wisdom of attempting to define, in advance, those crimes
which are inherently dangerous to human life for purposes of
applying the felony-murder rule may well be open to question.
In the case of arson, for instance, the English courts have tended
to take a "soft" position, holding that the inherently dangerous
quality of the act was for the jury to determine.38 It might be
sounder policy, assuming that it is sound policy to retain the
felony-murder doctrine at all, to leave the question of whether
the criminal act was one inherently dangerous to human life to
determination as the question arises in each case.39
The difficulty with the idea that liability ought to be imposed
only for deaths which are the natural and probable consequences
of a criminal act is basically, however, the same difficulty as that
found in the application of the res gestae test. The question of
what constitutes a natural and probable consequence is shrouded
with uncertainty. This is necessarily so since the question only
arises in the context of individual fact situations, each of which
must be determined on its own merits.
The attempts to lay down criteria for the determination of the
question have by and large been as unsuccessful with respect to
the natural and probable consequences rule as they have been
with respect to the question of when a killing falls within the
37. Perkins, supra note 7, at 560.
38. Compare the cases of Regina v. Serne and Regina v. Horsey, with
the decisions rendered by American courts in similar cases. State v. Leopold,
110 Conn. 55, 147 At. 118 (1929) ; Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111,
128 S.W.2d 208 (1939); Reddick v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1020,
33 S.W. 416 (1895); State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932).
In State v. Leopold, the defendant set fire to a building in which a father
and two children were sleeping. The father and children attained a place
of safety, and the children then returned to their quarters to get some
valuables, were caught in the fire, and killed. The court refused the de-
fendant's tendered instruction that he was not guilty if the jury found the
facts as stated above or if they found that the father had sent the children
back, and instead ruled that even if the facts were true the defendant was
not excused. The decision appears squarely in conflict with Regina v. Horsey.
39. But see HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 59 (1881), arguing that it may
well be sound policy for a legislature to impose drastic penalties on those
types of criminal activity which experience has demonstrated carry a high
degree of risk to human life.
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res gestae of a crime.4 0 That this is so is not surprising when
one considers the difficulties which surround the identical ques-
tion in the law of torts.41 Such criteria as have been developed,
moreover, are generally highly uncertain and variable in their
characteristics.
For example, it is often said in the cases that the fact that
other causes may have concurred in the homicide does not absolve
one from liability for it, if it was committed during the course of
a felony.42 An interesting illustration of this rule is found in the
-case of Governor Wall,'43 who sentenced a sergeant under his com-
mand on the island of Goree to a flogging of eight hundred lashes.
The sergeant afterwards drank a considerable quantity of liquor
and died. When Wall was tried for the crime some twenty years
later, the fact that the victim might not have died save for the
fact that he had commenced drinking was held no defense. Black-
stone cites the case of the harlot who left her newly born child
in an orchard, where it was killed by a bird of prey. Since in the
England of that time the intervention of such an outside force
was considered something to be expected, the woman was held
guilty of murder.44
Yet it is not all cases in which the intervention of outside forces
is held no defense. The case of the man trapped in the burning
straw, already mentioned, establishes that much. 4- It is a famous
rule of the common law that killing a man by perjury is not
mnurder." Wharton states that either the interposition of an
independent human will or the occurrence of "extraordinary
casualties" will excuse a defendant in such a situation.47
The basic question involved in the cases of intervening forces,
which appears to determine whether or not an intervening force
or cause will excuse the defendant, is generally whether the inter-
vention of the outside agency was something which, at the time
40. Kenny, op. cit. supra note 17, at 127.
41. Venable, Proximate Causes and Effects, 19 Miss. L.S. 183, 184-97
(1948).
42. State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 147 Atl. 118 (1929) ; State v. Block,
87 Conn. 573, 89 Atl. 167 (1913) ; State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 AtL.
'927 (1910) ; State v. Badgett, 87 S.C. 543, 70 S.E. 301 (1911).
43. Trial of Governor Wall, 12 How. St. Tr. 51 (1802).
44. 4 BL. COMM. *197.
45. Regina v. Horsey, 3 F. & F. 287, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (1862). See
supra text to note 32.
46. Rex v. McDaniel, 1 Leach 44, 168 Eng. Rep. 124 (1754); Kenny,
,op. cit. supra note 17, at 128.
47. WHARToN, HoICIDE § 358 (2d ed. 1875).
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the criminal act was committed, could have been foreseen as
"probable." And the determination of this question, as one writer
puts it, is one in which the jury "is called upon to do the impos-
sible."' It requires the members of the fact-finding agency, in
determining whether the final outcome of the crime was probable
at the time it was committed, to do two things: (1) to negate the
existence of the injury which has already been presented to their
knowledge, something which is really a psychological impossi-
bility ;49 and (2) after the knowledge that a homicide did in fact
result from the felony has been put to one side, to attempt, on
the basis of the facts concerning the felony alone, to determine
whether what actually happened was probable at the time.50 The
courts have not been successful in their endeavors to do this in
civil cases where the highly emotional factors inherent in the
felony-murder cases are not present; there is nothing to indicate
that they have been more so in the vastly more important felony-
murder cases themselves.5'
III.
It would appear desirable, in the light of what has been said,
to re-examine the felony-murder rule from something other than
the conventional standpoint used in discussing problems of cau-
sation in the law of torts. But first the need for a brief analysis
of the situations in which the felony-murder rule may become
operative is indicated.
Basically, the felony-murder rule applies in two situations:
(1) where one person, acting alone, commits a criminal act which
48. Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, 21 MicH. L. Bv.
34, 50 (1922). See also Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 3a
HARv. L. REv. 633 (1920).
49. "... when two things have been vividly connected they can seldom,
if ever, be separated again in our thinking. This holds true of law courts,
I take it, as of ordinary civil life. The jury for days, and sometimes weeks,
have had the act and the injury presented to them as inevitably connected.
The two are presented in close association. When they retire to consider
their verdict these two things are vividly in their minds. They cannot,
therefore, negate the injury and treat it as though it had never existed. Nor
can they look to the act uninfluenced by the existence of the injury.
"It therefore follows that the method which the jury is supposed to
follow in finding whether the reasonably prudent man could have foreseen
the incoming of the forces which produced the injury or the occurrence of
the type of injury which had been sustained, is an impossible one." Levitt,
supra note 48, at 51.
50. Levitt, supra note 48, at 50.
51. See Wright, The Law of Torts: 1923-1947, 26 CAN. BAR REV. 46, 56-60
(1948).
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results in death, and (2) where two or more persons, acting in
concert, combine to do a criminal act, and one of them does a
further act which ends in the death of a third person. In either
of these two basic situations, a number of variations are possible.
A homicide or death may occur either (a) by reason of an inten-
tional design on the part of one of the criminal actors, as in the
case of a deliberate killing of the victim of a crime for the pur-
pose of ending resistance; (b) by an attack committed in the
heat of anger or passion under circumstances which might other-
wise indicate a second degree murder or a manslaughter charge;
(c) by miscalculation of the effect of a force used to accomplish
the criminal purpose, as in the case of a man who underestimates
the power of a drug he has employed; or (d) by reason of an
unintentional or basically accidental act which possesses a deadly
character. The categorization thus suggested may not be all in-
clusive, but it furnishes at least a working analysis on the basis
of which some conclusions may be drawn.
The situation referred to in category (a), above, may be simply
illustrated: A and B agree to rob C. In the course of the robbery,
A stands guard outside of C's home or place of business, while B
enters to commit the actual crime. B deliberately shoots C, killing
him.
Rather clearly, under any version of the felony-murder rule
now followed by the law, both A and B are guilty. B is guilty
because the law says that proof of B's participation in the rob-
bery supplies proof of his intention to kill 0.52 A is guilty be-
cause the felony-murder rule says that when two or more persons
conspire to commit a criminal act, each is responsible for what
the other does in the furtherance of the joint design. 3
But a few questions occur. In the first place, if B intentionally
kills C, why should reliance be placed on the felony-murder rule
at all? The obvious answer is that the felony-murder rule supplies
a means by which the prosecuting attorney may escape the neces-
sity of proving the element of intent; in other words, it lightens
the task of the prosecution by allowing proof of intent to com-
52. People v. Hawk, 17 Cal.2d 812, 112 P.2d 225 (1941); Commonwealth
v. Green, 302 Mass. 547, 20 N.E.2d 417 (1939) ; State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926,
98 S.W.2d 632 (1937).
53. House v. State, 192 Ark. 476, 92 S.W.2d 868 (1936); Simpson V.
Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W.2d 869 (1943); State v. Adams, 339
Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632 (1936); People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 129 N.E.
883 (1921) ; Sir Charles Stanley's Case, KeLT. 86, 84 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1663).
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mit one crime to act as proof of intent to commit another. If
this is so, then a further question may well be asked: Is there
any reason to make this imputation of malice aforethought in
B conclusive? Why not simply hold that it raises a rebuttable,
instead of conclusive, presumption that B acted intentionally?
The force of this last question becomes considerably greater
when one considers the situation of A, the other participant. In
A's case the felony-murder rule performs a dual task. It first
automatically implies malice in B, thus making his crime murder.
After this has been accomplished, the rule says that since B
acted maliciously and intended to commit murder, A also neces-
sarily intended the result which followed.
Now this, it is extremely possible in the case of A, may well be
entirely fictional reasoning.5 4 The extent to which the felony-
murder rule embodies the use of this type of conceptualistic
thinking will become even clearer when one considers the second
category suggested in the analysis, the case where the homicide is
committed by one of the conspirators in the heat of anger or
passion under circumstances which would otherwise indicate a
second degree murder or manslaughter charge. A good illustra-
tion is the California case of People v. Cabaltero.5 Six conspira-
tors went to rob a man. Three of them remained outside the
victim's office as lookouts, while the other three entered to com-
mit the actual crime. One of the lookouts saw a car coming and
fired some shots at it, thus warning everyone in hearing distance
of the commission of the crime. The men inside the office rushed
out to see what had happened, and one of them, in a murderous
burst of rage, killed the man who had fired. It was held that all
the members of the group were guilty of murder.56
It would appear possible, however, to take serious issue with
the case. To impute the malice of the man who shot to the other
members of the conspiracy manifestly does not square with the
facts, since few if any of the conspirators could have had the
least idea of what was going to happen. Moreover, few acts
could be considered as more likely to impede the successful con-
54. Arent & MacDonald, supra note 15, at 309.
55. 31 Cal. App.2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).
56. See "pra note 12, for a comparison of this case with the English
view. The New York courts have stated that in such a situation the co-
conspirators would not be held responsible. See People v. Sobieskoda, 235
N.Y. 411, 416, 139 N.E. 558, 560 (1923). But cf. People v. Luscomb, 292
N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469 (1944).
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summation of the felony than the act of one conspirator in shoot-
ing another. Thus, the act of the one conspirator was not done
in the furtherance of the common design, and it seems clear that
the other conspirators ought not to have been held chargeable
for it. 57 The operation of the rule was as follows. The man who
shot did so in the commission of a felony, hence his killing was
automatically done with malice aforethought, so far as the law
was concerned. Since the man who killed was guilty of inten-
tional murder, all his fellow conspirators were likewise guilty,
because they intended what happened-at least in the eyes of the
law-as much as the actual killer.
The cases involving the situation where a criminal actor mis-
calculates the effect of a force he has employed-category (c)-
rest on a slightly different basis. In such cases it is possible to
argue a good deal more logically than in the cases involving acts
by a co-conspirator that a man who employs a criminal device to
accomplish a given criminal end ought to be held responsible if
the device or force used miscarries. In State v. Glover,8 a good
illustrative case, the defendant set fire to a drugstore, intending
to collect insurance on it. One of the firemen called to fight the
blaze was killed when an explosion took place in the store. It
was held that the fact the defendant had not intended the result
which followed his crime was no defense, and that the defendant
might be held criminally responsible for the death of the fire-
man.5 9 A reference to the English cases-Reginz v. Serne and
the case of the man who set fire to the strawstack and unknow-
ingly killed someone sleeping in the straw6 0-- will, as has been
pointed out, serve to make it clear that not all the courts are
agreed even in such a situation. But whereas the participant in
a joint felony often has little or no control over the acts of his
co-conspirators once the felony is under way, the man who em-
ploys a physical force such as fire or drugs to accomplish his
ends does not lack this control. There are, therefore, sound rea-
sons of policy behind a holding to the effect that once one has,
by a criminal act, launched such a physical force one is respon-
sible for any consequences which follow. The basic objection to
the felony-murder rule in the case of a killing by one of a group
57. Cases cited supra note 56.
58. 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932).
59. Cf. State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 147 Atl. 118 (1929).
60. See supra note 38.
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of co-conspirators is that it ignores the idea that guilt in each
case ought to be determined on the basis of individual miscon-
duct. 1 Such an objection does not apply in the case where a
person employs an unintelligent agency for the commission of a
crime. In such a case he may reasonably be expected to foresee
that the force he has set in motion may not come to rest in the
time planned.6 2
It is, however, the case suggested in category (d), above,
which presents the most extreme example of the operation of the
felony-murder rule. The courts have often said that an uninten-
tional or accidental killing, occurring during the course of a
felony, is murder under the felony-murder doctrine. 63 While it
is true, as has been pointed out," that many of these statements
are dicta, cases in which the point was squarely decided are not
difficult to find.65
It is the cases where the killing was unintentional or by acci-
dent, moreover, which rest upon the longest line of authority in
the felony-murder cases. As Coke's illustration of the boy in the
bush killed by the chance glance of an arrow demonstrates, the
rule that unintentional killings committed during the course of a
homicide are murder is really the keystone of the entire structure
of law which has been built about the felony-murder doctrine.
It is interesting, accordingly, to watch the felony-murder doc-
trine in operation in such a case.
Suppose, then, that A and B conspire to rob C, and in the course
of the crime B, nervous and frightened, accidentally shoots C and
kills him. The felony-murder rule operates as follows:
(1) The rule makes it clear that even though B had no inten-
tion of killing C in point of fact, the law will not allow him to
61. "The outcome of the brief survey above is the basic doctrine that,
insofar as legal rules rest on moral culpability, they must be confined to
volitional misconduct." Hall, Interrelations of C-iminal Law and Torts:
1, 43 COL. L. Rav. 753, 778 (1943).
62. HOLMES, TuE COMMON LAw 53-59 (1881).
63. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen, 131 F.2d 176
(8th Cir. 1942); Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 Pac. 869 (1918); People
v. Perry, 14 Cal.2d 387, 94 P.2d 559 (1939); Whitfield v. Commonwealth,
278 Ky. 111, 128 S.W.2d 208 (1939); Ford v. State, 71 Neb. 246, 98 N.W.
807 (1904) ; Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d 805 (1939).
64. Note, 21 MicH. L. REv. 95, 96 (1922).
66. Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922) ; Ford v.
State, 71 Neb. 246, 98 N.W. 807 (1904); Mumford v. United States, 130
F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 317 U.S. 656 (1942).
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say so.66 The unintentional character of the killing is not a fact
which varies B's legal liability at all, though in other areas of
the criminal law the fact would have tremendous importance.
B is at once put in the same class as the man who is guilty of a
deliberate, premeditated killing, although both the judge and the
jury know that such a classification is factually incorrect.
(2) The rule says further that even though A had no intention
of killing C and may in fact have been unaware of the shooting
when it occurred, he likewise had a deliberate intention to cause
the death of C.67 This result follows because it has already been
decided that B was guilty of the intentional slaying of C, and
therefore that all of his fellow conspirators had the same inten-
tion. In point of fact, this is not true, but that is immaterial;
the law will not allow this conflict with reality to operate in miti-
gation of A's crime.
Now, whatever else may be said of the felony-murder rule in
this situation, it is clear that it compels the court in a case of
this type to reach its results on the basis of reasons which de-
monstrably do not square with the facts. And if what the courts
say in a murder case is not true, it is submitted that the courts
ought not to say it.
Actually, would it not be more logical in this situation simply
to say that A and B are clearly guilty of robbery, that their case
ought to be submitted to the jury on the issue of homicide for
consideration of all the facts, including the issues of intent and
premeditation, and that the jury should be told only that they
may, if they think the evidence sufficient, weigh the fact that a
felony was being committed when the homicide occurred in
reaching a decision as to whether or not the killing was actually
unintentional? It may be objected that this means that no charge
of murder can be sustained at all, and so it does. But in point
of fact in the situation postulated, B did not act with intention
or deliberation at all. And A neither planned nor took part in
66. M Cutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N.E. 544 (1927); Common-
wealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941); Commonwealth v. Mc-
Manus, 282 Pa. 25, 127 At. 316 (1925). Cf. Ford v. State, 71 Neb. 246,
98 N.W. 807 (1904).
67. People v. Cabaltero 31 Cal. App.2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939); State v.
Terrell, 175 La. 753, 144 o. 488 (1932), noted, 18 CORN. L. Q. 439 (1933);
People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 129 N.E. 883 (1921); Commonwealth v.
Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941); Commonwealth v. McManus, 282
Pa. 25, 127 Atl. 316 (1925).
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the killing of C. If he did join with B in planning to kill C, the
fact may be proved and ought to be proved instead of inferred.68
Such a solution would present at least one way around the
problems of the felony-murder rule. It has the following ad-
vantages:
(1) It avoids the necessity of reliance on vague tests con-
cerning the res gestae of a crime.
(2) It bypasses most of the difficulties which are inherent in
deciding the issues of causation present in many of the felony-
murder cases.
(3) It is consistent with the ordinary presumption of inno-
cence which surrounds a defendant in criminal cases, whereas
the felony-murder rule as presently constituted is not.6 9
(4) It would impose punishment on each person involved only
for his own acts and not for the acts of some other person, thus
making guilt exclusively individual.
(5) It would be consistent with the general rule of policy that
intent is a necessary element of serious crimes, whereas the
present rule is not.
Particularly in so far as unintentional or accidental killings
are concerned, it has long been recognized, especially by the
English courts, that the felony-murder rule operates capriciously
and irrationally. In a recent case decided by the United States
Supreme Court, the following comment appears:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient no-
tion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil. A relation between some mental element and
punishment for a harmful act is almost as familiar as the
child's familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to,' and has
afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished sub-
stitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retalia-
tion and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecu-
tion.7 0
It is submitted that the same rationale should be applied to the
felony-murder cases. There is undoubtedly a good deal of logic
in saying that the commission of a felony, particularly of the
68. WHARTON, HOMICIDE § 59 (2d ed. 1875).69. Id. at § 58.
70. Morissette v. United States, 72 Sup. Ct. 240, 243 (1952).
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kind involving violence or the use of armed force, is a circum-
stance tending to show a specific intent to kill. All that is pro-
posed here is that the conclusive character of the inference drawn
from proof of the commission of an antecedent felony be ended.
The rule ought to be changed to provide that proof that a killing
occurred during the commission of a felony raises a rebuttable
presumption that the necessary specific intent was present. It
may be objected that such a rule would do violence to the funda-
mental principle that every man is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But such an objection
simply underscores the basic nature of the objection to the felony-
murder doctrine as it presently exists, for what is present now
in the felony-murder cases is not even a rebuttable but a conclu-
sive presumption, and there are many cases phrasing the effect
of the felony-murder rule in precisely that fashion.7 1
There is little to show that the present rule is effective as a
deterrent upon criminal enterprises. It appears to have grown
out of a medieval legal system which punished small crimes with
death as quickly as large ones, and hence was indifferent to
whether it put a man to death for shooting another's deer or for
shooting his deer-keeper, as the case of Lord Dacres, from which
this discussion started, illustrates, 2 Indeed, it is this very factor
which has been used as a defense for the rule. Wharton tells us
that Chief Justice Fortescue, exhibiting the superiority of the
English over the Roman law, used this very illustration. "Crime
was repressed so he leaves us to infer, because criminals of all
grades were exterminated." 3 The law should not, in modern
times, continue a rule with such a sanguinary basis.
71. State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 S.W. 516 (1889); Rhea v. State, 63
Neb. 461, 88 N.W. 789 (1902); Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N.W. 788
(1897).
72. WHARTON, HOMICIDE § 59 (2d ed. 1875), Arent & McDonald, supra
note 15, at 290, n. 10.
73. VHARTON, HOMICIDE § 59 (2d ed. 1875).
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